One of the tasks of the System and Decision Sciences Area in 1976 has been the investigation of problems in "fair division". In a general sense, the problem is how to divide and distribute various goods (or bads) equitably among competing agents in a system. A particularly important aspect of this question is the institutions through which distributional decisions are made. In particular. what are the consequences of different divisions of decision-making powers? This paper addresses the problem of measuring the relative effectiveness of agents in organizations where decisions are taken by vote. The results have application to the estimation of inequalities in, and the equity of. various distributions of decision-making authority.
INTRODUCTION
The bribing of legislatures and other decision-making bodies for the furtherance of special interests has a long history that doubtless has not ceased to the present day.
One of the most notorious alleged cases of bribery was reported by the Scotsman [4] . would appear to depend on two factors: the minimum price a voter is willing to accept under any circumstances, and his "worth" to the one who is buying his influence (i.e., his power).
George Lockhart in his Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland
In recent years, various numerical measures of power have been proposed--notably, those of Shapley-Shubik [8], Banzhaf [I] and Coleman [3] . Each of these measures is ultimately based on the idea that a voter is powerful insofar as he can change the outcome by changing his vote. The view we shall take here is that it is not enough that a voter be able to change the outcome: he must have an incentive to do so. Thus, if we are able to identify the equilibrium prices that a lobbyist, for example, would pay for the members' votes, we would have a measure of their relative power in the Hobbesian sense.
In the next sections we shall develop a concept of equilibrium prices and incomes for arbitrary voting games, and compare the results with the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf measures.
VOTING GAMES
A simple game, or in this context, a voting game G = (N,S) , is a finite set N of players, together with a collection S of subsets of N called winning coalitions which satisfy azs,
SES and S C T + TES . Second, there is no apparent incentive for a player in a winning coalition to change his vote and make the measure fail (unless we suppose that each voter's objective is merely the capricious demonstration of his influence, irrespective of his actual preferences). The Coleman measures of power [3] are similar to Banzhaf's but they make a distinction between the power to pass a measure and the power to block it, a valuable distinction that will be discussed later on.
The Shapley-Shubik measure may be defined in the following way. Let all the players line up in a row il,i 2,... ,in (all ordering~ being equiprobable). Player ik is pivotal if k is the first index for which {il,i 2,...,ik} E S. Thus the pivotal player is the one who putatively gets credit for having passed the measure.
The Phapley-Shubik power of player i , ai(G), is defined to be the probability that i is pivotal. 
EQUILIBRIUM PRICES
In this section we introduce a model of political power in which the players receive the benefits of their power in terms of money payments. To paraphrase Hobbes, the power of a voter will be measured by the amount someone would pay for the use of it.
We therefore introduce into the political arena a lobbyist, who is assumed to have a large quantity of funds at his disposal. We shall further assume that in the given voting game G a bill (or succession of bills) is introduced that the lobbyist wants passed.
The lobbyist desires simply to pass the bills at least cost. The objective of each player is to maximize his "bribe" income. In general we may expect that the more power a player has, the higher the price he will command and the greater the income he will receive. The problem is to find the prices and incomes of the various players.
Let pi 2 0 be the price of player i , EN. p(S) = 1 piis iES the cost of bribing the subset SGN. We shall assume that the lobbyist is a "price-taker", that is, the players announce their prices p and then the lobbyist bribes some least-cost winning set -S. A payment scheduZe for the lobbyist is therefore a function f which for any price vector p gives a set f(p) = SE S satisfying -p(S) 2 p(St) for all S' E S.
Given f, an n-person game is defined on the set N of players in which each player i quotes a price pi and gets a payoff pi if is f(p), and zero otherwise.
However, in general, the only equi- Suppose on the other hand that C is a group of players each of whom raises his price, and that each does better than before.
If the new price vector is p', then this implies CCf(p') = T.
Since only the players in C raise their prices, all others remaining the same, any minimum cost winning set S under p must contain C, since otherwise it would cost less under p' than does T. Therefore C is contained in every p-minimum cost set; but the intersection of these is empty.
Thus p is a strong equilibrium.
We may in fact conclude that p is a collective equilibrium (and the unique one) with the help of a result which follows Lemma 1.
First we need the following definitions.
We say that P 2 po is a canonical equilibrium for f if it is a collective equilibrium for f and pi = pp for all i#f(p). In other words, a canonical -equilibrium is a collective equilibrium in which every player who is not bribed is at his floor price.
Indeed, at equilibrium there can be no advantage for a nonbribed player to quote more than his floor price, for by quoting his floor price he may at least be competitive in the sense that he could be a member of some least cost winning set. In fact, any collective equilibrium is just a canonical equilibrium in which some players who are not bribed quote unrealistically high prices (Lemma 2 below).
For any given floor prices p0 -> 0 define 1 pi is maximum over all p satisfying (4) and (5).
iENO -Notice that "for some" in (5) is equivalent to "for every", given (4) .
Proof.
Let p be any feasible price vector such that for some -
p-minimumcost winning set TI pi = pi for all i$T.
We claim (4) For any set S* E S minimizing p" (S) we have
hence C L S*, and pl(S*) = p'(S1 Referring to Example 1, we see that players 1 and 2 are the only ones who could be above their floor prices in a canonical equilibrium. Moreover, among all p of form (pl ,p2, 1,1,1,1,1) such that pl + p2 is the minimum cost of a winning set, pl + p2 = 5 is maximum; hence by the Corollary, (3,2,1,1,1,1,1) is a canonical equilibrium for the f defined earlier, and in fact it is the only one.
Lemma 2.
If p is a collective equilibrium for f then 6 is a -canonical equilibrium for f, where ei = pp for i ( £(PI, Ci = Pi for i E f (p) .
-
A

Proof.
Let p, p be as above, and let f (p) = S*. Suppose ---that for some S E S, ;(s) < C(S*) , and we will derive a contra-
Let 2 = {S E S:;(S) =min=a) and for each SE 3 let C = S {iE S-S* : pi> pi).
Then CS f 4. Let CT be a minimal element of the family {Cs:S~ 21, and define q by Evidently, g (T) = @(T) = a, and since q -2 6, a = q (T) = min q (S) . If T' is any winning set such that q (TI) = a, then - Lemma 2 shows that any non-canonical collective equilibrium is just an inessential variant of some canonical equilibrium, and
Lemma 1 tells us how to recognize the latter. The problem is then to determine when a canonical equilibrium exists.
Clearly one situation in which it cannot exist is if the voting game contains a veto player, for the price of any such player can increase without bound, and there will be no finite maximum in (6). It turns out that this is the only exception:
if there are no veto players then the game always has a collective equilibrium.
To see this, consider condition (5) of Lemma 1:
?(so) 2 p(S) for all SES and sOaS is equivalent to which in view of (4) 
The dual of (16) where for each k, Tk ranges over all k-subsets of {4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 We define the passing income (or passing power) of player i, Qi, to be his expected income over all equilibrium pairs (p,f)
[with po as above), normalized so that the total power is 1.
If (p,f) is an equilibrium pair then f (p) E SO, and for any --payment schedule g which satisfies g (p) t SD, (p,g) is also an equilibrium pair.
Therefore if (as is normally the case) P is unique, then letting so = ~sOI, sp = ~{SE SO:iE S}l we have
If there is more than one canonical equilibrium, then the set P of all of them forms a convex set, and the p of formula (17) is taken to be the cent.roid of P. winning coalition is one that is able to pass a measure whereas in F a winning coalition is one that is able to block a measure.
In general, the canonical equilibrium prices for G and G will be different.
For the U.S. Federal case the complementary game is described by the minimal winning sets:
The unique canonical equilibrium prices are seen to be pR = ps = pv = 1, pp = 17. -The blocking income (or blocking power), of player i is defined to be his passing income relative to the game G. The distinction between blocking and passing incomes is a valuable one. However, for comparison with the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices, it is useful to consider the players' expected income with respect to passing and blocking together. Define the income (or ~JCL~CI~) of player i , 'Pi, to be his total expected income (relative to po = I), normalized so that the total is 1:
where p, 6 are the centroid canonical equilibria for G and G re---spectively and so, so, etc., have the obvious interpretation.
The passing and blocking incomes for the U.S. Federal Game are given in Table 1 , and the incomes are compared with the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf values in Table 2 . For a priori computations of power it was assumed that the floor prices of all players were equal. This is in keeping with the notion that a floor price represents the minimum payment commensurate with the act of accepting a bribe at all, which a priori is not different for the different players. Another interpretation is that the floor price represents some kind of minimum expectation; it could then be argued that the more powerful players will naturally have higher expectations, and therefore higher floor prices.
If we follow this idea to its conclusion, we might indeed assert that the equilibrium prices, once established, become the new floor prices. Does this lead to a kind of "second order" equilibrium?
The answer is easily seen to be no, since if p is a collective Table 3 with a majority of 63 of 115 required to pass a measure. 
Evidently r
= ri for all i E SO.
We claim that whenever rC is defined and I c I (13, 10, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3) and quota q = 27. As shown before, for pa = 1 the unique canonical --equilibrium prices are (4~,3~,1~,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 ,1) , which satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2 but are not integer.
INCORRUPTIBLES
So far it has been assumed that every player's vote can be bought, and, moreover, that each player threatens to vote contrary to the lobbvist's wishes unless he is bribed. The more general viewpoint may be adopted that for any issue which the lobbyist supports there will be a certain subset of players who support the measure and therefore do not need to be bribed, whereas there are other players who cannot be bought at any price (incorruptib1,e.s).
This situation can be handled by a simple modification of the foregoing ideas. Given game G = (N,S) we assume that before bribing begins, a certain set ALN of players announce their position in favor, that another set BGN-A of players are irrevocably opposed, and that the remainder, N -(AUB), are merely waiting to be bribed.
In effect, the players in A voluntarily accept a bribe price of 0, while those irrevocably opposed have a floor price of +m.
If A wins, or if N-B loses, then the lobbyist has nothing to do. Otherwise, the lobbyist behaves as if the game were where S' = {S G (N -(A U B) ) :S U A E S) and prices and incomes are determined accordingly.
